Homophobic remarks and reclassification in press law
Homophobic remarks: the Cour de cassation rejects the distinction between homosexuality and homosexual people and reaffirms the court’s power to reclassify offences
In a judgment of 9 June 2026, the chambre criminelle of the Cour de cassation provided two important clarifications on press offences.
First, it specifies the circumstances in which remarks about homosexuality may be regarded as directly targeting homosexual people.
Second, it restates the obligations incumbent on the courts where an offence prosecuted under one legal classification in fact falls under another classification provided for by the Law of 29 July 1881 (French Press Freedom Act).
A case arising from a controversial article
The dispute originated in the publication of an article entitled “L’homosexualité, ses raisons” (Homosexuality, its causes), posted online in 2022 on the website lesalonbeige.fr, which describes itself as a “daily news blog by lay Catholics”. Its author, a Catholic priest, sought to respond to an educational video about homosexuality and its presence in the animal world.
The text contained several particularly controversial passages. The author argued, in particular, that homosexuality “dehumanises” or “makes people stupid”, while drawing parallels between homosexuality, perversion and child sexual abuse. Some of these assertions were also supported by statistical data presented as demonstrating an over-representation of homosexual people among perpetrators of sexual offences against minors.
Following a complaint lodged by several associations, the author of the article and the website’s publication director were prosecuted for public insult on grounds of sexual orientation.
After a conviction at first instance, the cour d’appel de Paris ultimately acquitted the defendants.
The distinction between homosexuality and homosexual people: a line the Court rejects
One of the main contributions of the judgment concerns the distinction drawn by the appeal judges between homosexuality and homosexual people.
To justify the acquittal, the cour d’appel had held that the remarks at issue formed part of a doctrinal and religious reflection on homosexuality and did not directly target the individuals concerned.
The Cour de cassation takes a radically different view.
It considers that the passages prosecuted do not merely set out a religious position or criticise a conception of homosexuality. In its view, the terms used directly attack homosexual people themselves on account of their sexual orientation.
This analysis leads the Court to hold that the remarks at issue are outrageous and contemptuous in nature, which is incompatible with the requirements laid down by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the chambre criminelle on freedom of expression.
The judgment thus reiterates that a religious or moral stance enjoys no particular immunity where the expressions used undermine the dignity of an identified group of people.
An important clarification on the reclassification of press offences
The second issue examined by the Court concerned a passage attributing to homosexual people significant involvement in child sexual abuse.
The cour d’appel had held that these assertions amounted not to insult but to defamation, since they were based on the allegation of specific facts which could, in theory, be debated in adversarial proceedings.
However, having reached that conclusion, it acquitted the defendants without examining the facts from the standpoint of defamation.
It is precisely this reasoning that the Cour de cassation censures.
It points out that, in press matters, the principle is that the classification set out in the instrument initiating the prosecution cannot be altered. However, Article 54-1 of the Law of 29 July 1881 provides for an exception for certain discriminatory offences, in particular those committed on grounds of sexual orientation: where the facts prosecuted under one classification appear to fall under another discriminatory classification provided for by law, the court may reclassify them, provided that it reopens the proceedings on that point.
In this context, where a court considers that facts prosecuted as insult in fact amount to defamation, it cannot simply draw the consequences of that finding and acquit the defendants. It must examine the facts in the light of the new classification, reopening the proceedings.
Quashing limited to the civil claims
The practical scope of the judgment should, however, be qualified.
The Cour de cassation did not definitively call into question the criminal position of the defendants. As the public prosecutor had not appealed, the provisions relating to the criminal proceedings have become final.
On the other hand, the appeal judgment is quashed insofar as it dismissed the claims brought by the associations acting as civil parties.
The case is therefore remitted to a differently constituted bench of the cour d’appel de Paris to re-examine solely the civil consequences of the facts at issue.
Key takeaways
This judgment illustrates the vigilance of the Cour de cassation with regard to discriminatory remarks based on sexual orientation.
It confirms that reference to a religious doctrine is not sufficient to neutralise the insulting nature of remarks directly targeting the people concerned. It also reiterates that the reclassification mechanisms provided for by the 1881 Law must be fully applied where the circumstances so require.
The judgment thus forms part of a line of case law that seeks to reconcile the protection of freedom of expression, respect for pluralism of opinion and the protection of human dignity.
Sources
Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, 9 June 2026, No. 25-81.573, published in the Bulletin
Article 29 of the Law of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of the press
Article 33 of the Law of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of the press
Article 50 of the Law of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of the press
Article 53 of the Law of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of the press
Article 54-1 of the Law of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of the press
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